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Abstract 
In response to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and of the release of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5, this study develops a 
risk-based evidential reasoning approach for assessing the effectiveness of internal controls 
over financial reporting (ICoFR). This approach provides a structured methodology for 
assessing the effectiveness of ICoFR by considering relevant factors and their 
interrelationships. The Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions is utilized for representing 
risk.  
First, we develop a generic ICoFR assessment model based upon a Big 4 audit firm’s approach 
and apply it to a real-world example. Then, based on this model, we develop a quantitative 
representation of various levels of ICoFR effectiveness and related risk-assessment as defined 
by the PCAOB and contrast these representations with levels implied by Auditing Standard No. 
5. In doing so, we demonstrate the potential value of formal risk assessment models in both 
facilitating the assessment of risks in an individual engagement and in assessing the effects of 
different regulations. 
Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), PCAOB Audit Standard No. 5, Internal Control over 
Financial Reporting, Evidential Reasoning, Risk-Assessment, Theory of Belief Functions.  
1. Introduction 
Internal control evaluation is a risk-assessment process (PCAOB Audit Standard No. 5) 
utilized by both a firm and its auditor to assess various aspects of the firm’s accounting 
information system. Accounting internal control systems which are affected by an 
entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel are designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, the 
reliability of financial reporting, and compliance of the organization with laws and 
regulations (COSO, 1992). The importance of effective internal controls has long been 
recognized in the auditing literature (Mautz and Sharaf 1961). Effective internal control 
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can help companies achieve established financial goals, prevent loss of resources, 
keep accurate recording of transactions, and prepare reliable financial statements 
(Ernst & Young 2002).  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act) has resulted in renewed attention to internal 
controls over financial reporting (ICoFR). The act makes reporting on internal controls 
mandatory for SEC registrants and their independent auditors. Section 404 of the Act 
directs the SEC to adopt rules requiring annual reports of public companies to include 
an assessment, as of the end of the fiscal year, of the effectiveness of internal controls 
and procedures for financial reporting. Section 404 also requires the issuer’s 
independent auditors to attest to and report on management’s assessment. Section 
302(a) of the act requires that the CEO and CFO must assess the effectiveness of the 
issuer’s disclosure controls and procedures, of which ICoFR are a part. In May, 2007 
the PCAOB released Audit Standard No. 5 which encourages a ‘risk-based’ 
implementation of Sections 404 and 302(a).  This paper develops and illustrates a 
framework that may be used in such an implementation. 
Throughout the post-SOX era, both auditors and their clients have been concerned with 
the provision of an effective and efficient evaluation of ICoFR. However, in the period 
following the enactment of SOX up to the present, the fulfillment of Section 404 ICoFR 
assessment has imposed heavy burdens on external auditors and management. For 
example, both the business press and academic research (e.g., Ettredge et al. 2006) 
suggest that companies have experienced significantly longer audit delay due to SOX 
404-compliance, which has made it more challenging to implement the Security 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 60-day filing deadline.  Research also has shown that 
investors tend to react negatively to longer audit delays (e.g., Chambers and Penman 
1984). Further, the announcement of a material weakness in internal control systems 
has been associated with drops in stock price, increased share volume, and even some 
CFOs losing their jobs (Durfee 2005).  
All of these possible effects of providing assurance under SOX 404 indicate that being 
able to effectively and efficiently evaluate ICoFR, to quickly identify the major 
weaknesses in control systems, and to quickly take remedial actions to fix these 
weaknesses is critical. A structured and systematic approach to SOX 404 mandated 
internal control assessment could help in achieving such a goal.  This paper, by 
proposing such a methodology and demonstrating its application, presents an approach 
that should be helpful to the assurance provider, to management and to regulators.  
Both qualitative and quantitative methods exist for the evaluation of internal controls 
(IC). Conventionally, auditors have adopted qualitative methods, such as 
questionnaires, checklists, flow charts, and test of transactions for evaluation purposes. 
Previous research (e.g. Yu & Neter 1973; Cushing 1974, 1975; Mock & Turner, 1981) 
point out that such methods are ineffective and the assessments generated by 
qualitative methods are of dubious values for developing comprehensive internal control 
evaluation models. Alternatively, a number of quantitative methods, including both a 
stochastic model (Yu & Neter 1973), and a reliability model (Cushing 1974) were 
developed and improved upon by several researchers (e.g., Grimlund 1982; Srivastava 
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and Ward 1983; Srivastava 1986). Unfortunately, research on IC assessment methods 
has been somewhat scarce in the past decade.  And, none of the cited approaches 
provide an appropriate basis for SOX 404 assessment.   
The methodology proposed by this study is an evidential reasoning approach which is 
based upon the Dempster-Shafer theory of Belief Functions. This approach provides a 
systematic way to represent the interrelationships among key accounting system 
components for the evaluation of ICoFR, including significant accounts being evaluated, 
business processes impacting these accounts, risks to which business processes are 
exposed, control procedures implemented to counter the risks, and evidence gathered 
to evaluate the effectiveness of control procedures.  
Given judgments on strength of the audit evidence gathered as input, the proposed 
method provides a rigorous algorithm to aggregate these judgments, propagate and 
aggregate the results, and output quantitative risk assessments on various levels within 
the accounting information system. Included are assessments related to the overall 
ICoFR, significant accounts level, business process level, individual risk level, and 
individual control procedure level.  These detailed quantitative representations provide 
important information upon which both management and auditors can make inferences 
on the effectiveness of ICoFR at both the overall financial statement level and various 
more detailed levels. Such information is also valuable in facilitating the process of 
identifying any major weaknesses existing in the IC system, and for optimizing the value 
of IC investment. 
As noted, the main objective of this study is to propose and demonstrate the 
implementation of an evidential reasoning approach for an efficient and effective risk 
assessment of ICoFR. We attempt to achieve this objective through addressing the 
following important research questions: 
1. What is an appropriate definition of internal control risk? 
2. What is the generic structure of an ICoFR risk assessment model? 
3. What is an appropriate mapping rule between the model’s quantitative 
representations and alternative assessment opinions (e.g., effective, 
ineffective, significant deficiency, material weakness)? 
4. What are appropriate representations of an accounting information system 
and the relationships among financial statement assertions? 
5. What is an appropriate way of assessing the expected value of the addition of 
various controls and safeguards on risks? 
6. How has the release of PCAOB Auditing Standard No.5 altered the requisite 
risk assessments? 
To address these research questions, the remainder of the paper is divided into the 
following sections. Section 2 introduces the theoretical foundation of the evidential 
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reasoning approach. Section 3 defines internal control risk, and develops a generic 
evidential reasoning model for IC assessment. Section 4 illustrates the use of the 
generic model based on a real SOX 404 case, and discusses how to quantitatively 
represent varying levels of ICoFR effectiveness. This section also attempts to assess 
the impact of several features of PCAOB Auditing Standard No.5 on the assessments. 
The last section concludes the paper.  
2. Evidential Reasoning Approach under Dempster-Shafer (DS) 
Theory of Belief Functions 
The evidential reasoning approach under the Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of belief 
functions has been widely used in a broad range of disciplines (e.g., see, Srivastava 
and Mock 2002),. Examples directly related to accounting information systems and 
auditing include applications in audit and assurance services (e.g., Srivastava and 
Shafer 1992; Shafer and Srivastava 1990; Srivastava and Mock 2000), artificial 
intelligence and expert systems (e.g., Gordon and Shortliffe 1984; Xu, Hsia and Smets 
1993), data mining and information systems security evaluation (e.g., Wilkins and 
Lavington 2002; Sun, Srivastava, and Mock 2006), and financial portfolio management 
(Shenoy and Shenoy 2002).  
Basically, this evidential reasoning approach is a process of risk assessment where 
several variables (assertions) when combined together inform us about a variable of 
interest such as the effectiveness of internal control. It allows the decision maker to 
develop a framework that aggregates all the evidence available in the situation 
pertaining to various intermediate variables and then infer about the variable of interest. 
Such a feature makes the approach appealing to the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
the ICoFR system because the ultimate effectiveness relies upon multiple factors such 
as the effectiveness of multiple control procedures, the control environment, and 
evidence gathered from various sources.  
Rather than using probabilities to represent uncertainties, we use belief functions to 
represent uncertainty in the evidential reasoning approach. Belief functions theory was 
made popular by Shafer (1976). It is a generalization of Bayesian theory and unlike 
probability theory it represents ignorance as a separate explicit component of the 
evaluation. There are three basic functions that are important to understand the use of 
belief functions in a decision-making process: m-values, belief functions, and plausibility 
functions. Dempster's rule is the fundamental rule similar to Bayes' rule in probability 
theory for combining items of evidence. Appendix A elaborates on the basic concepts1. 
3. A Generic Evidential Reasoning Model for Sarbanes-Oxley 
Mandated Internal Control Assessment 
3.1 Definition of Internal Control Risk 
                                                 
1 Readers are suggested to refer to Srivastava and Mock (2002) and Yager et. al (1994) for more 
elaboration and applications of Belief Function theory. 
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The proposed approach defines ICoFR risk as the plausibility that deficiencies in ICoFR 
systems result in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement within the 
annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected. According to 
the PCAOB, there is a hierarchy of possible deficiencies: control deficiency; significant 
deficiency, and material weakness. How do we tie our ICOFR risk definition to this 
hierarchy? In the present paper, we define two possible states of a control system; 
either the control system is effective (e) or ineffective (~e) in controlling the possible 
errors in accounting for financial transactions. In addition, we consider that if the control 
system is ineffective then there are three possible conditions of ineffectiveness: 
deficiency, significant deficiency, and material weakness. These conditions depend on 
how sever the deficiency is. We elaborate this approach below. 
 As mentioned earlier, we use the plausibility that the control system is ineffective as the 
definition of control risk. Srivastava and Shafer (1992) have used a similar definition in 
defining audit risk as the plausibility of material error in the financial statements. Sun et 
al (2006) have used it to define information security risk as the plausibility that the 
information system is not secure. We use the following set of m-values and the 
corresponding plausibilities, to define four levels of effectiveness and ineffectiveness 
(deficiency, significant deficiency, and material weakness) of a control system. 
Effective Control System: 
m(e) ≥ 0.90, m(~e) ≤ 0.1, i.e., Pl(~e) ≤ 0.1, and Bel(~e) ≤ 0.1. 
Deficient Control System: 
0.9 ≥ m(e) ≥ 0.70, m(~e) ≤ 0.30, i.e., 0.1 ≤ Pl(~e) ≤ 0.30, and Bel(~e) ≤ 0.30. 
Significantly Deficient Control System: 
0.70 ≥ m(e) ≥ 0.50, m(~e) ≤ 0.5, i.e.,  0.30 ≤ Pl(~e) ≤ 0.5 and Bel(~e) ≤ 0.50. 
Materially Weak Control System:  
0.5 ≥ m(e), m(~e) ≥ 0.5, i.e., Pl(~e) ≥ 0.5, and Bel(~e) ≥ 0.50.  
Note that there is obvious flexibility in these definitions and the stated ranges and 
thresholds can be altered to suit the particular audit firm risk preferences and client 
situation. However, the following arguments provide support for using the above 
definitions as a starting point. First, a system of ICoFR is effective if the belief mass, i.e., 
m-value, that it is effective exceeds a threshold level, say 0.9. This means that if the 
evidence related to a control effectiveness suggests that m(e) ≥ 0.90, we define that 
system to be effective. The corresponding belief mass that the control system is 
ineffective may be equal to or less than 0.1, i.e., m(~e) ≤ 0.1. These values yield the 
plausibility that the control system is ineffective to be less than 0.1, i.e., Pl(~e) ≤ 0.1. 
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A system of ICoFR is defined as deficient when the evidence suggests that the belief 
mass that it is effective is not as high as the threshold of effective control, but at the 
same time there is substantial evidence that it is effective. This is the reason we 
assume the belief mass in support of its effectiveness to be between 0.9 and 0.70, i.e., 
0.9 ≥ m(e) ≥ 0.70. In this case, the assessed belief related to possible ineffectiveness of 
the control system may be less than 0.30, i.e., m(~e) ≤ 0.30. The above definition of an 
effective system of ICoFR and these m-values yield a value for the plausibility that the 
control is not effective to be between 0.1 and 0.30, i.e., 0.1 ≤ Pl(~e) ≤ 0.30. In other 
words, the control system is assessed to be deficient if the control risk is between 0.1 
and 0.30, and the belief that the control system is ineffective is less than 0.30, i.e., 
Bel(~e) ≤ 0.30. 
A system of ICoFR is significantly deficient if the evidence suggests that the belief 
associated with the control system being effective is at a medium level between 0.70 
and 0.5, i.e., 0.70 ≥ m(e) ≥ 0.50, and the belief mass that the control system is not 
effective is below 0.5, i.e., m(~e) ≤ 0.5. These m-values yield a values of the plausibility 
that the control system is not effective between 0.3 and 0.5, i.e., 0.3 ≤ Pl(~e) ≤ 0.5. This 
suggests that a control system is significantly deficient if the control risk is between 0.3 
and 0.5 and the belief that the control is not effective is less than 0.50, i.e., Bel(~e) ≤ 
0.50. 
Lastly, a system of ICoFR is materially weak when the evidence suggests that the belief  
associated with the control system being effective is low, say below 0.5, i.e., m(e) ≤ 0.5 
and the belief related to the ineffectiveness of the control system is greater than or 
equal 0.5, i.e., m(~e) ≥ 0.5. These m-values yield a value for the plausibility that the 
control system is ineffective that is greater than 0.5, i.e., Pl(~e) ≥ 0.5. This definition 
implies that the control system should be classified as materially weak when the control 
risk is greater than 0.5 and the belief that the control is ineffective is greater than 0.5, 
i.e., Bel(~e) ≥ 0.50. Again, we note that these ranges and thresholds may be altered 
depending on the client situation and the risk profile that assurance provider is willing to 
accept. 
3.2 Structure of the Generic Model 
The generic evidential reasoning model developed here is based upon a Big 4 firm’s 
model of risk assessment as implemented under Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 
2004). Potential modifications based on Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB 2007) are 
then considered to illustrate some of the useful features of the model.  
The generic risk assessment model sketched in Figure 1 consists of a financial 
reporting part and a business process part. The financial reporting part depicts the 
hierarchy of the following main components from the left to the right: parent company, 
subsidiary company, and the significant accounts on financial statements. The 
‘hierarchy’ relates to the aggregation of control risk assessments from the significant 
accounts to the overall consolidated entity. The business process part consists of the 
management assertions concerning the ICoFR system pertinent to the significant 
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accounts, risks associated with these assertions, and the control procedures 
implemented to mitigate these risks. Thus, internal controls are designed to control risks 
specific to management’s assertions concerning the accounting information system 
effectiveness.  
As depicted in Figure 1, the structure of the generic, evidential reasoning model 
proposed here corresponds to the risk assessment model of a Big 4 auditing firm. In the 
model, the main assertion to be evaluated is “The system of internal control over 
financial reporting (ICoFR) for the consolidated entity is effective”. Since the 
effectiveness of ICoFR at the consolidated entity level depends upon the effectiveness 
at each subsidiary, the system of ICoFR for each subsidiary being effective is 
expressed as a first-level sub-assertion. To examine whether the system of ICoFR for 
subsidiary i is effective, an assessor should examine the effectiveness of the IC related 
to significant accounts. An account is significant if it could contain material errors. The 
second level sub-assertion states that “The system of ICoFR for a significant account 
(e.g., cash) is effective”. These are the main components of the financial reporting 
component of the generic model.  
The remaining part of the proposed model is the business processes component that 
relates to a specific management assertion. Assertions, including the main assertion 
and sub-assertions, are represented by rounded boxes in the evidential diagrams. In 
this part of the model, the traditional idea of controls over financial accounts is 
elaborated by adding several layers of sub-assertions between the financial accounts 
and the actual controls. The effectiveness of each significant financial account depends 
on whether each of several multiple assertions is valid or not. Typical assertions to be 
considered are “Existence”, “Completeness”, “Valuation” and “Presentation” (see AU 
Sec. 326, Evidential Matter). 
Broadly speaking, for each management assertion, we have several potential risks, and 
for each risk there may be more than one internal control to mitigate the risk. In the 
model, the third level sub-assertion is expressed as “The system of ICoFR for a 
management assertion related to a financial account is effective”. Each assertion may 
be threatened by one or more risks. Thus for a system to be effective a number of fourth 
level sub-assertions expressed in general as “An assertion is protected from an ICoFR 
risk” must be true. Every risk can be mitigated by one or more controls. The existence 
and effectiveness of each control is expressed as the fifth level sub-assertion.  
The generic model provides the baseline structure for the implementation of the 
proposed approach. The baseline structure is adaptable to a user’s specific situation 
and interest, since it allows users to add additional assertions, and to modify or delete 
existing assertions in the generic model.  
Relationships among the main assertion and the first level to the fourth level sub-
assertions are represented by “and” relationships. An ‘and’ relationship implies that the 
higher level assertion or sub-assertion is true if and only if each lower level sub-
assertion is true. One or more internal controls can be implemented to protect a process 
related to a management assertion from a risk. If controls are compensating to each 
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other, a process is protected from a risk if some controls (but not necessarily all of 
controls) are effective. Therefore, the relation between compensating controls is 
represented by the “or” relationship, which implies the higher level sub-assertion is true 
if any of the lower level sub-assertions is true.  If controls are not compensating, the 
overall assessment of internal control pertaining to the management assertion is not 
effective unless all controls pertaining to it are functioning effectively. Therefore, non-
compensating controls are linked through the “and” relationship. In Figure 1, each fourth 
level sub-assertion is connected through an “and/or” relationship with the related fifth 
level sub-assertions. Thus, which relationship is appropriate is dependent upon the 
nature of controls. 
Evidence, represented by a rectangular box, is information obtained to support or 
negate one or multiple assertions. Evidence nodes are connected to the corresponding 
assertion(s) (the main assertion or any sub-assertion) that they directly pertain to.  
One or multiple evaluation procedures can be performed to evaluate the effectiveness 
of a control. Evaluation procedures produce items of evidence which support, negate, or 
support and negate (i.e. mixed evidence) control effectiveness. The degree of support 
or negation is represented by the strength of evidence, the assessment of which 
requires expert judgments. Often, one evaluation procedure provides support or 
negation to more than one control. 
Given that evidence should pertain to the assertion(s) it directly supports or negates, 
evidence can be located at various layers of the model. In Figure 1, evidence that 
directly pertains to the effectiveness of controls is connected to the various fifth-level 
sub-assertions which assert the effectiveness of a particular control procedure.  
Evidence related to a higher level assertion in the model such as the organizational 
control environment helps evaluate management’s attitude toward the development of 
accounting estimates, its financial reporting philosophy, and the context in which the 
accounting system and internal controls operate. For example, evidence concerning the 
client’s ‘control policies & procedures’ will have an impact on multiple sub-assertions 
and therefore is connected to the main assertion. As noted, evidence nodes are 
represented by rectangular boxes in the evidential diagrams.  
3.3 Algorithm for evidence aggregation 
In this study, the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions is employed to assess, 
aggregate and propagate the evidence within the model. As Shenoy and Shafer (1990) 
have discussed, the aggregation process becomes quite complicated as the model 
grows. However, there are several software packages available (see, e.g., Shafer et al. 
1988, Zarley, et al. 1988, and Saffiotti and Umkehrer 1991) that facilitate the 
aggregation and propagation process. Recently, Srivastava (2005) has developed an 
alternative form of Dempster’s Rule of combination which allows one to easily program 
the logic in MicroSoft Excel spreadsheets to compute the combined m-values for a large 
number of independent items of evidence. Also, Srivastava et al (1995) have developed 
analytical formula for combining items of evidence in an “and” tree which is a typical 
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evidential diagram for assessing internal controls. These two developments greatly 
enhance the proposed approach’s practicability and simplicity of use. In the paper, the 
computation is conducted in Excel using the formula developed by Srivastava (2005) 
and Srivastava et al (1995).  
4. Extending the Generic Evidential Reasoning Model for Sarbanes-
Oxley Mandated Internal Control Assessment Based on Auditing 
Standard No. 5 Assumptions 
In this section, we demonstrate the approach by applying it to a real engagement from 
one of the Big Four auditing firms. The actual engagement was conducted when 
Standard No. 2 was in force. Then we consider some differences that would have 
occurred if the analysis had been conducted under Standard No. 5.  
In this engagement, the auditing firm provided advisory services to a client in the 
financial industry concerning the client’s responsibilities under SOX 404 requirements. 
We obtained the client’s financial statements and documentation of all business 
processes related to management assertions, business risks, control procedures 
implemented, and the auditing firm’s evaluation of the control procedures.   
The original documentation provided a large volume of information. To simplify the 
illustration discussed here, we developed an evidential reasoning model for the ICoFR 
evaluation related to the most significant account on the company’s balance sheet: “Net 
Loans”. The baseline model is depicted in Figure 2 in a form similar to Figure 1. The 
unaudited value of this account was $28.9 billion, clearly a material amount for this 
company. 
4.1 An Assessment of Beliefs and ICoFR Risks under Auditing Standard No. 2  
Auditing Standard (AS) No. 5 demonstrates how to incorporate knowledge accumulated 
from prior years’ audits into the assessment of ICoFR. According to AS No. 5, auditors 
should consider the significant controls that would prevent and detect material 
misstatements in the account being considered. In addition, when deciding about the 
extent, nature, timing and staffing of testing the internal controls, the auditor should 
consider prior year’s assessments of the internal controls and also use the work of the 
others based on the effectiveness and objectivity of the other sources. For example, the 
auditor can use both the prior year experience and also the internal auditor’s 
assessment of the internal controls when deciding the extent, nature and timing of 
controls tests. One way an analytical model such as that presented in this paper can be 
useful is to help regulators and others analyze the effects of such changes in standards. 
The Research Question that this leads to is: 
RQ1: How does each change in a standard affect the assurance provider’s risk 
assessments and the efficiency and effectiveness of the engagement? 
The shaded items of evidence in Figure 2 are the ones that are to be considered under 
AS No. 5. Since these items of evidence may not have been considered in the actual 
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engagement which was conducted under AS No. 2, the input values for these items of 
evidence were zero belief that controls are effective and zero belief that the controls are 
ineffective in Figure 2. In other words, these items of evidence do not exist under AS 
No. 2. 
Figure 3 represents the situation under AS No. 5. Here we assume the auditors have 
formally considered the following items of evidence: 1) prior year (PY) experience with 
the internal controls, 2) use the work of others such as internal auditors (IA), and 3) 
evidence about controls at the entity level and at the individual account level. These 
items of evidence are depicted in Figure 3.  
There is no well-accepted rule in terms of the quantitative belief representation for 
various levels of IC effectiveness. In Table 1 we show the assumed m-values as the 
auditors’ evaluation on the effectiveness of individual control procedure using the 
classification schemes defined in the previous section. As noted, these values can be 
changed according to the audit firm’s preferences. Importantly, one feature of an 
analytical model such as that illustrated in this paper is that sensitivity analysis can be 
performed to evaluate the effects on the assessments of ICoFR of different assumptions 
as to what constitutes effective and ineffective control.  
Table 1: Types of Internal Control Effectiveness Defined in Terms of Belief Values. 































Effective 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Bel(e) = 0.98 
Bel(~e) = 0 
Control is 
Deficient 0.70 0.10 0.20 0.3 
Bel(e) = 0.7 
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Bel(~e) = 0 
Based upon an “and” relationship, after aggregating all items of evidence, the model in 
Figure 2 (Prior to AS No. 5) suggests that there is zero belief that the IC on the ‘Net 
Loan’ account is effective, 91% belief that the IC on the ‘Net Loan’ account is 
ineffective, and 9% of ambiguity indicating that it is unknown whether the IC is effective 
or not. If we use the same mapping rule as suggested above, the overall assessment 
opinion suggested by the model would be that the overall IC on ‘Net Loan’ has a 
material weakness. Although Figure 3 yields a similar conclusion, the assessment 
process is much more efficient because of the consideration of the other items of 
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evidence such as the prior year experience, the work of internal auditors, and giving 
consideration to the entity level controls and the account level controls. As one can see 
from Figure 3, the level of belief that needs to be obtained from the tests of control is 
lower than the level desired without these additional items of evidence. This illustrates 
one use of the model presented in this paper, which is an explicit assessment of the 
change in the risk assessments that result from collecting additional audit evidence. 
If such evidence is already available (for example, based on prior years audits), then the 
auditor needs to do less work in the current year to obtain the same level of overall 
confidence whether the controls are effective or not. Thus, it appears that the 
implementation of AS No. 5 ought to lead to cost savings in providing assessments on 
internal controls. 
4.2 Assessment of Beliefs and ICoFR Risks under Auditing Standard No 5 
AS No. 5 focuses on ‘risk’ rather than ‘coverage’. This change may be interpreted as 
leading to adding some branches of the baseline evidential network sketched in Figure 
2 and leads to our second research question:   
RQ2: How does a ‘risk-based’ approach under AS No. 5 for assessing ICoFR 
risks affect the assessed beliefs and risks and affect the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the audit in comparison to a ‘coverage-based’ approach 
under AS No. 2?  
As mentioned earlier, Figure 3 depicts the evidential diagram for the audit process 
under AS No. 5 whereas Figure 2 depicts the evidential diagram for the audit process 
under AS No. 2. The main difference between the two approaches is that under AS No. 
2, the auditor was supposed to evaluate each pertinent internal control through 
performing control tests and not consider the evidence from the prior year (PY) or not 
use the work of others such as internal auditors (IA). Although these procedures are 
depicted as items of evidence in Figure 2 as rectangular boxes, they are not performed 
as shown by shaded boxes (the input values are zero for and against the IC being 
effective). In Figure 3, these procedures are performed (not shaded any more), i.e., the 
auditor considers these additional items of evidence. The assessed input beliefs by the 
auditor based on PY knowledge about the internal controls and based on IA are input in 
the evidential diagram. As seen from the input values in Figure 3, these values are 
relatively small in favor of IC being effective (from 0.1 to 0.3) except in one case it is 
small, 0.1, but against the IC being effective. The evidence at the higher level assertions 
coming from assessing the control environments is assumed to be 0.2 and 0.5, 
respectively, in support of the corresponding internal control assertion. The effect of 
these additional procedures is that the level of belief desired from control tests for each 
specific internal control is at a lower level than what was desired to obtain the same 
level of overall confidence as in the evidential diagram based on AS No. 2.  
The above findings suggest that not only the assessed risk and beliefs based on the 
prior year knowledge of the internal controls and the knowledge about the control 
environment reduce the desired level of beliefs from the control tests and hence make 
 12
the process more efficient, but also, in effect, reduce the cost of performing these tests 
of controls as a result of reduced desired level of beliefs and thus making the process 
more cost effective. 
5. Conclusions 
The fulfillment of SOX Section 404 requirement of ICoFR imposes heavy burdens on 
auditors and management. In the period when AS # 2 was in effect, many companies 
had difficulties meeting the SEC deadlines and in providing appropriate control 
documentation. We argue that an appropriate methodology for ICoFR evaluation such 
as that suggested and illustrated here, may help facilitate Section 404 compliance.   
This paper has developed an evidential reasoning approach under Dempster-Shafer 
(DS) Theory of Belief Functions for the assessment of ICoFR. We discuss the 
theoretical ground of the approach, develop a generic evidential reasoning model, and 
further demonstrate the model using a real example. The approach provides a 
structured manner to incorporate key assessment factors and their interrelationships 
when estimating ICoFR risk. It provides a rigorous algorithm to aggregate an assessor’s 
beliefs. The approach helps discipline the assessor’s thought process in estimating IC 
risk and may serve as a useful decision aid for auditors and management to conduct an 
effective and efficient evaluation on ICoFR.  
In addition, an analysis of the proposed model for two scenarios, prior to AS No 5 and 
post-AS No 5, suggests that the implementation of AS No 5 should lead to more 
efficient evaluation of internal controls’ effectiveness and thus would lead to a significant 
cost saving. 
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Figure 2: An Example of the Evidential Reasoning Model for the IC Effectiveness Evaluation under Auditing Standard No. 2 
e ~e {e,~e}
1a-PY: 0.00 0.00 1.00
1b-IA: 0.00 0.00 1.00
1c-TC: 0.00 0.90 0.10
0.00 0.00 1.00 2a-PY: 0.00 0.00 1.00
2b-IA: 0.00 0.00 1.00
2c-TC: 0.00 0.00 1.00
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3c-TC: 0.98 0.00 0.02
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4a-PY: 0.00 0.00 1.00
4b-IA: 0.00 0.00 1.00
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 0.94 0.00 0.06 6b-IA: 0.00 0.00 1.00
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Figure 3: Evidential Reasoning Model for the IC Effectiveness Evaluation under Auditing Standard No. 5 
e ~e {e,~e}
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5b-IA: 0.30 0.00 0.70
5c-TC: 0.92 0.00 0.08
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Appendix A: Definitions of Basic Functions of Belief-Function Theory 
The Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of belief functions has its root in the mathematical 
theory of probability. Dempster’s work during 1960’s and Shafer’s work during 1970’s 
constitute the bulk of the foundational work on belief functions (see Shafer 1976 for 
details). However, the work done during 1990’s by Shenoy and Shafer (e.g., see 
Shenoy and Shafer 1990) is what gave the computational power that was needed to 
propagate beliefs through a network of variables in a real world problem as done in the 
present paper. The basic difference between probability and belief functions is that how 
uncertainties are assigned to the state of nature in a problem. In probability framework, 
we assign uncertainty to each state of a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
set of states of nature. These uncertainties are known as probabilities and they all add 
to one. Under DS theory, as discussed next, uncertainties are assigned to all the 
singletons, all the subset of two elements, all the subsets of three elements, and so on 
to the entire set of elements. In principle, such a distribution is distribution of probability 
numbers over the super set of the mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive set of 
states. There are three basic functions that are important for the current paper. We 
introduce them briefly along with the introduction to Dempster’s rule of combination. 
Dempster’s rule combination of independent items of evidence is similar to Bayes’ rule 
of conditioning in probability theory. We elaborate this rule later in the section. Although 
Shafer’s book Mathematical Theory of Evidence (19976) is still the classic reference on 
belief functions, interested readers are encouraged to see the following publications for 
recent references: Yager et al (1994), Srivastava and Mock (2002), Dempster et al 
(2008). 
The Basic Probability Assignment Function (m-values) 
The basic probability assignment function is one of the fundamental functions under DS 
theory. The following discussion elaborates the concept related to this function. 
Suppose we have a decision problem with n possible elements or states of nature 
forming a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive set represented by {a1, a2, a3, … 
an}. Call this entire set a frame represented by the symbol Θ. As mentioned earlier, in the 
belief-function framework, uncertainty is not only assigned to the single elements of the 
frame but also to all other proper subsets of the frame and to the entire frame Θ. These 
uncertainties are called m-values (Shafer 1976). Similar to probabilities, all these m-





where A represents all the subsets of the frame Θ, and ∅m( )=0 , i.e., the m-value for the 
empty set is 0. 
 19
Belief Function 
The belief function measures the overall belief in a state or combination of states based 
on the evidence gathered. Basically, the belief function for a subset of elements, say A 
of a frame Θ, is defined as the sum of all the m-values for the individual elements in the 





Bel(A) = m(B) , 
where B is any subset of A. For example, belief in the subset {a1, a2} is: Bel({a1, a2}) = 
m(a1 ) + m(a2 ) + m({ a1, a2}). 
Plausibility Function 
The plausibility function for a subset of elements A, of a frame Θ, is defined to be the 
maximum possible belief that could be assigned to A if all future evidence were in 
support of A. 





Pl(A) m B  
The plausibility function can also be defined in term of belief function as: 
Pl(A) = 1- Bel(~A). 
Assuming A is an assertion that internal control is effective and ~A means that the 
internal control is not effective. The belief that the internal control is not effective is given 
by Bel(~A) where as the plausibility that the internal control is not effective is given by 
Pl(~A), which represents the maximum possible belief that the control is not effective. 
The plausibility in ‘~A’, i.e., Pl(~A),  in effect, measures the risk that the internal control 
is not effective. Srivastava and Shafer (1992) use such a definition of plausibility of 
material misstatement in the financial statements to be the audit risk. 
Dempster's Rule of Combination 
Dempster's rule is the fundamental rule for combining independent items of evidence in 
DS theory, similar to Bayes’ rule in probability theory. For simplicity, let us illustrate 
Dempster's rule for only two independent items of evidence. Let us assume that m1 and 
m2 are the two sets of m-values obtained from the two independent items of evidence 
pertaining to a frame, Θ . The combined m-values (basic probability assignment func-
tion) for a subset A of frame Θ  using Dempster’s rule is given by: 
m(A) = K-1 Σ{m1(B1)m2(B2)|B1 ∩ B2 = A, A≠∅ }, 
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where K = 1− Σ{m1(B1)m2(B2)| B1 ∩ B2 = ∅ }. 
The constant K is known as renormalization constant. The second term in K arises 
because of the conflict between the two items of evidence. When K = 0, the two items of 
evidence are not combinable; they conflict each other completely. 
